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Abstract
The sustainability of welfare states requires high employment and high participation to raise
the tax base. To analyze labor supply in a world with market frictions, we propose and solve
a macro model of the labor market with unemployment and labor force participation as endo-
genous and distinct states. In our world, workers’ decisions of participating are determined
by an entry decision and an exit decision. A calibration of the model improves the usual
representations of labor markets, since it quantitatively accounts for the observed flows between
employment and nonparticipation. The paper investigates also the effect of payroll taxes and
unemployment benefits on participation decisions. Taxes reduce entries and increase exits,
whereas unemployment benefits, at a given job-finding rate, raise entries and have ambiguous
effects on exits. (JEL: J2, J6)
1. Introduction
Given demographic pressures in Western economies, the sustainability of many
welfare-state programs requires high employment and high labor force participa-
tion in order to raise the tax base and avoid distortions. However, most economic
analysis understands the determinants of labor supply only in a world without
market frictions, and workers’ participation in the labor market is often described
by a neoclassical labor supply function. In the four chapters of the Handbook of
Labor Economics devoted to labor supply, there are very few references to the
role of search frictions.1 Participation decisions in imperfect labor markets are
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1. The most advanced paper in this direction is Blundell and MacCurdy (1999), who discuss
intertemporal decisions (p. 1672ff), notably human capital decisions and habit persistence, with no
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not yet fully understood. Moreover, from a macroeconomic perspective, we know
little about the interactions between workers’ participation decisions and firms’
incentives to create jobs.
To better understand the functioning of an imperfect labor market with endo-
genous labor supply, our paper investigates a three-state macro model of the labor
market in which the following decisions by agents are endogenous: job creation
decisions by firms; job destruction by worker/employer pairs; entry and exit deci-
sions in the labor market by workers; and, in (unreported) extensions, search-effort
margins. Our modeling approach is based on the observation that people spend
simultaneously a large amount of time in both market and home production, a
feature of the data that has already been exploited in the macroeconomic literature.
Recently, the business cycle literature has improved the calibration of various
aspects of the data by enriching the time allocation problem on the part of the
household so as to explicitly consider the choice between leisure, home produc-
tion, and market work.2 But the existing business cycle literature studies home
production within frictionless labor markets. Our goal, conversely, is to study the
frontier between market and home production in an imperfect labor market.3 In
our world, heterogenous workers face idiosyncratic shocks to home productivity,
but market frictions impose a cost to labor market participation. Since we work
with a technologically fixed number of hours, our analysis abstracts from the
intensive margin of labor supply and concentrates on the extensive margin.
In the paper, we explore in detail the effects of time-consuming search, a
labor market friction that has attracted a great deal of attention in the macro
literature (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, 1999; Hall 1999). Our paper shows
that job-search costs lead the decisions to participate and stop participating to
be dynamic decisions and to differ: labor supply is described by two margins,
an entry margin and a quit margin. The two decisions differ all the more when
frictions are important, and conversely they coincide when frictions vanish. The
gap between the two decisions is due to employed workers hoarding on the job,
since quitting involves the loss of irreversible search investment when frictions are
positive. Similarly, this employment hoarding effect does not exist in the absence
of frictions.4
explicit role for stochastic arrival of job offers. They conclude (p. 1686) by saying that “There remain
a number of big issues that we have not touched on in this chapter but that are important for labour
market analysis. . . . Another issue relates to the process of job search and job matching.”
2. Notably, output volatility, the correlation between hours and productivity, and the correlation
between investments in home and market capital (Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright 1991; Rios-Rull
1993; McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright 1992; Gomme, Kydland, and Rupert, 2001).
3. An important exception is Nosal, Rogerson, and Wright (1992), who show that, in an indivis-
ible labor model with home production, involuntary unemployment arises in equilibrium without
assuming that leisure is an inferior good.
4. To our knowledge, the irreversibility of investments developed in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) has
not been transposed to the analysis of labor supply.
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The paper, then, explores the positive and normative implications of this
setting. From the positive standpoint, we account for a labor market with three
states: people spend time in employment, unemployment, and full-time home
production. The two labor supply margins also rationalize the recent important
work of Jones and Ridell (1999) and Sorrentino (1993, 1995), who emphasize the
difficulty of defining the frontier between nonparticipation and unemployment.
Notably, they show that there exist agents who report that they would like a job
yet do not search, which is one of the main insights of the model. This allows
us to define a broader concept of unemployment that takes this population into
account. Second, the model can quantitatively account for the large flows between
the three labor market states, and we present a calibration that aims to replicate
the monthly flows for the United States in the 1990s.
From the normative standpoint, we argue that the existence of two differ-
ent labor supply margins has some policy implications. We show under what
conditions the decentralized unemployment rate is too high and the vacancy/
unemployment ratio inefficiently low in the presence of taxes, even when wages
internalize search frictions. The paper also discusses the conditionality of unem-
ployment benefits and examines their entitlement effects—that is, the fact that
an increase in unemployment insurance increases the attractiveness of market
participation among the noneligible nonemployed (Mortensen 1977; Fredriksson
and Holmlund 2001). Our theoretical analysis highlights the existence of a par-
ticipation hoarding effect, which we define as the additional incentive to hold on
to market participation that is induced by conditional eligibility.
Our work is not the first attempt to incorporate endogenous labor market
participation features into standard models of search. On the microeconomic
side, Seater (1977), Burdett and Mortensen (1978), Burdett (1979), Burdett et al.
(1984), and Swaim and Podgursky (1994) have successfully investigated the rela-
tions between search frictions and labor supply given a fixed supply of jobs. Our
theoretical distinction between inactivity and unemployment, empirically con-
sistent with Flinn and Heckman (1983), is inspired by Burdett and Mortensen
(1978). In the macro search literature, Bowden (1980), McKenna (1987), Pis-
sarides (1990, chap. 6), and Sattinger (1995) have introduced a labor demand
side and endogenous participation in a way that brings few new insights as com-
pared to the standard (two-state) model of matching. Individuals have a hetero-
genous value of nonmarket time and decide in a static (though intertemporal) way
about their participation in the labor market. It follows that the flows between
activity and inactivity are driven by macroeconomic changes (in productivity, in
unemployment) and are thus mainly cyclical or conjunctural flows. In contrast,
our theory—building on both macroeconomic factors and individual (household)
shocks—is able to account for permanent, structural flows between activity and
inactivity, even when macro conditions are unchanged. Pries and Rogerson (2002)
is another recent attempt to incorporate labor market participation in a macro-
economic framework.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines the main properties of the
labor supply margins in a partial equilibrium context, when the job-finding rate
is exogenously fixed. Section 3 derives the general equilibrium of the model and
proves its existence. Section 4 analyzes the two policy dimensions of the paper,
namely the role of taxation and unemployment benefits. It highlights also the
counterfactual empirical predictions, and it discusses how these can be dealt with
in the context of our theory. Section 5 presents a calibration of the baseline model
and shows how our framework can rationalize most flows across the three labor
market states. We also discuss quantitatively the role of conditional unemploy-
ment benefit. Section 6 concludes.
2. Labor Supply with Search Frictions
2.1. Framework
Time is continuous and there is a mass, 1, of risk-neutral individuals who are
allocated 1 unit of time. They derive linear utility from home production (leisure)
and from market activity. We consider a given skill segment of the labor force in
which the marginal productivity is homogenous at a level y. Individuals are paid
a wage w (determined later on) and produce x units of utility per unit of time if
they are engaged in home production.
Workers wanting to participate in the labor market undertake a time-consum-
ing search. The time allocation problem of the worker is defined as follows: hw
is the number of hours actually worked, hs is the search intensity necessary to
obtain a job, and hh is the choice of hours spent in leisure/home production. The
time constraint is thus
1 = hw + hs + hh with hw ∈ {0, e} and hs ∈ {0, s}
where e is the inelastic number of hours worked and s is the inelastic number of
hours spent looking for a job (we discuss this assumption later on). There is no on-
the-job search, so job search and employment are mutually exclusive activities.
It follows that in the three states W,U , and H (where W is employment, U is
unemployment, and H is full-time home production), the flow utility of agents is
given by
vW = (1 − e)x + w
vU = (1 − s)x
vH = x
where x is home productivity and w is the total wage received for the e hours
worked. Throughout this section, we assume 1 ≥ e ≥ s. It is important to
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note that, following Becker (1965), home production or leisure consumption are
formally expressed in the same way (raising an individual’s utility).5 Hereafter,
we keep the home production interpretation of x, but interpretations in terms of
time-varying marginal utility of leisure are possible.
We assume that there is some heterogeneity in the valuation of nonmarket
activities. Concretely, home productivityx is heterogeneous and stochastic, and its
value changes according to a Poisson process at rate λ.6 Conditional on the arrival
rate of a shock, the value of home productivity takes a value from a continuous
distribution f (x) and c.d.f. F(x) defined over the support x ∈ [xmin, xmax]. For
a nonemployed individual, the participation decision is whether to spend 0 or s
hours in the labor market, whereas the participation decision for an employed
worker is whether to work e or 0 hours: our model is an extensive margin model
and we ignore hereafter such issues as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
bargaining over hours, and work sharing. We further assume xmin ≤ 0 to ensure
that there will be market participants at equilibrium.
Labeling by W,U , and H the present discounted value of the utility of work-
ers in each state and using W for W(x), W ′ for W(x′), and so forth (for simplicity
of exposition), the recursive Bellman equations in the three states read as follows:
(r + λ)W = vW + λ
∫ xmax
xmin
max(W ′, U ′, H ′) dF (x′)
+ δ[max(U,H) − W ]
(1)
(r + λ)U = vU + λ
∫ xmax
xmin
max(U ′, H ′) dF (x′) + p[ max(W,U) − U ] (2)
(r + λ)H = vH + λ
∫ xmax
xmin
max(U ′, H ′) dF (x′) (3)
5. The simplest interpretation is that of Becker (1965). Utility is the consumption of bundles,
representing a combination of time and money. Here, home production is intensive in time, while
market activity is intensive in money. Gronau (1977, p. 1100) states that “[the distinction between
home production and leisure], so common in everyday language, disappeared in Becker’s more
general formulation. The omission is partly due … to the large number of borderline cases (e.g., is
playing with a child leisure or work at home?).”
6. Changes in x are thought of as individual and family shocks with large variance and low fre-
quency. The alternative assumption in which x is fixed but heterogeneous and y is time-varying,
even in the simplest case in which y takes two values only, gives twice as many margins as in our
specification. Our modeling choice is analytically simpler. Further, time variations in the value of
nonparticipation (due e.g., to disease, children education, changes in household income, etc.) are
sufficiently large for driving a significant part of the transitions between activity and nonparticipa-
tion. Pries and Rogerson (2002) have made the opposite modeling choice and hence must keep track
of the wage distribution.
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where δ is the Poisson parameter of a process of exogenous destruction of the job
and p is the Poisson job-finding rate for workers (treated as a parameter in partial
equilibrium and endogenized in general equilibrium). The first equation states that
the equity value of employment is the sum of the utility flow, the capital gain (or
loss) from a home production shock after which workers reoptimize (they decide
whether to hold onto the job W ′, look for another job U ′, or leave activity H ′),
and the capital loss of being hit by a destruction shock δ in which case workers
decide whether to search for a new job or to resume full-time home production.
The second and the third equations have a similar interpretation for the λ shocks.
In addition, upon getting a job offer with arrival rate p, unemployed individuals
decide whether or not to accept it in considering max (U,W).
To solve for wages, we need to introduce firms. A firm has either 0 or 1 worker.
As long as there are frictions (i.e., when p has finite value), successful matches
yield a pure economic rent. As is conventional in the search-matching literature,
those rents are split in fixed proportion between firms and workers. Formally, the
value of a filled position for the firm depends on x if the wage depends on x. We
have
(r + λ)J (x) = y − w(x) + δ(VV − J ) + λ
∫ xmax
xmin
max(J ′, VV ) dF (x′), (4)
where y is the marginal product of the worker and VV is the value of a job vacancy
(treated in partial equilibrium as a parameter). The equity value of a job is the
sum of flow profit, the capital loss following exogenous job destruction, and the
capital gain after a change in workers’ characteristics—possibly leading to job
destruction if the worker quits.
Nash bargaining over w follows the usual rule
w = arg max[W − max(U,H)]β [J − VV ]1−β, (5)
and it follows that wages split the surplus into sharesβ and 1−β. It can be guessed
that there are two wage rules, depending on the sign of U − H . If U ≥ H ,
then workers hit by an exogenous destruction shock (δ) look for another job.
If U < H , then workers hit by this type of shock exit the labor market and
become engaged full-time in home production. The expression for wages is in the
Appendix (Section A.1, equations (A.4) and (A.5)). They conventionally appear
as a weighted average, with weights β and 1 − β, respectively, of the marginal
product net of the firm’s outside option (in equity value) and a term reflecting the
“threat” point of workers (i.e., either U or H ).
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2.2. Reservation Strategies and Definitions
We can now derive the slopes of the value functions W , U , and H with respect to
x. With linear utility, the value functions are piecewise linear functions of x, as
proved in Appendix A.2. Let us introduce the cutoff points xν and xq , defined by
U(xν) = H(xν), (6)
W(xq) = H(xq). (7)
The ordering of the slopes implies the following ordering of intersections: xq ≥
xν . This is always the case in a viable labor market with W > U ; see Figure 1,
which shows these value functions with respect to x. Here W(x) has a kinked
point at the cutoff value of home production xν , corresponding to the change in
the outside option of workers.
We are now in position to clarify a few labor concepts. Above xq one finds
only workers engaged in full-time home production, or nonparticipants. Between
the two cutoff points xν and xq , one finds two categories of workers. First, some
of them are nonparticipants but do not search for a job: this corresponds to a well-
identified group of agents in labor statistics: there are indeed persons willing to
work but not ready to pay the search cost—nonemployed agents whose home
productivity belongs in the interval [xν, xq ]. In Jones and Ridell (1999), those
workers are called marginally attached to the labor market. These workers would
accept a job if offered one, but they do not wish to pay the search cost. We can
thus define a broader concept of unemployment, one that includes unemployed
job seekers as well as those who are marginally attached to the labor market; we
call this the extended unemployment rate. Second, there are employed workers.
The individual history of such workers shows a low value of x < xν , and each
has searched for (and found) a job in the past. We call them unattached employed
Value functions 
x q xν 
H(x) 
W(x)
U(x) 
x: home productivity
Figure 1. Value functions of home productivity x.
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workers because they would leave the labor market after a job destruction shock δ.
Finally, below xν , one finds both unemployed job seekers and employed workers.
We label the latter attached employed workers because they would be willing to
search for a new a job if hit by a job destruction shock δ.
2.2.1. Entry Margin. The first indifference condition (6) defines an entry mar-
gin, a level of home productivity at which the worker is indifferent between full
time home production and searching for employment. Formally, the entry margin
reads sxν = p(W − U)(xν). This states that the forgone value of home produc-
tion in the job-search activity sxν must be compensated by an equivalent gain in
expected surplus p(W −U), given search frictions. Appendix A.3 determines the
value of the total surplus and hence of the surplus of workers, leading to
β
e(xq − xν)
r + λ + δ =
sxν
p
(8)
where the term sxν/p stands for the expected value of foregone home production
during search while the left-hand side is the worker’s share of the total surplus of
the match. Hence this is a free-entry condition into the labor market. At a given
p, this equation defines a positive link between xν and xq . The higher the quit
cutoff point xq , the higher the surplus on the job and thus the more attractive the
labor market is, inducing further entries and a larger xν .
2.2.2. Quit Margin and Employment Hoarding. The second indifference con-
dition (7) defines a quit margin, a level of home productivity at which a worker
is just indifferent between working in the market and being full time in home
production. Using (A.2) in Appendix A.1 yields
exq = wna(xq) + λβS, (9)
where
S =
∫ xq
xmin
[J ′ − VV + W ′ − max(U ′, H ′)] dF(x′) > 0
is the average value of a match, net of the firm, and the worker’s outside option.
Equation (9) states that the forgone value of home production on the job is larger
than the wage from market activity by a factor that reflects the future expected
surplus of the job given stochastic transitions in x. This is an employment hoarding
effect. It is the exact counterpart of the labor hoarding effect for a firm that faces
hiring and firing costs and expects higher productivity from labor in the future: the
firm thus pays a wage above marginal productivity on a temporary basis in order
to save on turnover costs (see e.g., Bertola and Caballero 1994). Note that the
employment hoarding effect disappears as the surplus on-the-job S goes to zero,
which is in particular the case when frictions disappear.
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Further, given (A.5) in Appendix A.1, we have
exq = y − rVV + λS. (10)
The intuition behind equation (10) is similar to that for equation (9). It states
that the marginal worker at the quit margin has home productivity equal to the
neoclassical reservation productivity y/e minus a term reflecting the bargaining
power of the firm, plus the employment hoarding term. In other words, under free
entry of firms (rVV = 0), the sacrifice of home production for the marginally
indifferent worker would be above market productivity by a quantity reflecting
anticipated future gains of being on the job, given that quitting involves time spent
to search. After straightforward calculations of the value of S in Appendix A.3
(equation (A.6)), we finally obtain
xq = y
e
− rVV
e
+ λ
r + λ + δ
∫ xq
xν
F (x)dx + λ(e − s)/e
r + λ + δ + βp
∫ xν
xmin
F(x)dx
At a given p, this equation defines a negative link between xν and xq : the larger
xν , the smaller the employment hoarding term and thus the less conservative
employed workers deciding whether or not to quit.
2.3. Existence and Properties of Labor Supply in Partial Equilibrium
In partial equilibrium, both p and VV are treated as parameters.7 The two labor
supply margins can be usefully analyzed in the space (xq, xν); see Figure 2. It
shows that there is a unique equilibrium in (xq, xν). The proof of this statement
is in Appendix A.4.
Note also that the quit margin is vertical when λ = 0, with xq at a level
(y − rVV )/e. This deserves some comment. When λ = 0 ( i.e., when there
is no stochastic change in x), we have a “static participation model”: people are
permanently either in or out of the labor force. The quit cutoff point is still defined
as exq = y − rVV , but above xν there are only nonemployed workers, and since
xq > xν , the quit margin is not active. The model has dynamic participation when
λ > 0: the quit margin is activated.
Why does it matter? As an illustration, consider for instance an increase in
p, still treated as a parameter here. This affects the entry curve but not the quit
curve: the larger p, the easier it is to find a job and thus the larger the incentive
to participate in the labor market (higher xν at a given xq ). Put otherwise, the
opportunity cost sxν/p of searching is lower, raising incentives to participate.
7. We study xν and xq for a given worker in a given firm, whereas rVV (which is formally derived
later on) may be a function of xν′ and xq ′ in other firms.
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x
xq
Quit margin
Entry margin
Figure 2. Entry and quit margins in partial equilibrium.
The role of frictions on labor supply can thus be understood: in an efficient labor
market with large p, workers quit more easily because they can always come back
to the labor market. With λ = 0, the quit point is instead independent of p. In the
limit as p → +∞, the difference xq − xν tends to zero and both quantities tend
to the neoclassical entry point y/e. In this subsection, we have illustrated the role
of dynamic participation decisions in a frictional labor market. The labor supply
margins have, in turn, a general equilibrium effect that we now explore.
3. Labor Demand and General Equilibrium
3.1. Labor Demand
The general equilibrium is derived by adding a free-entry condition on firms,
which endogenizes VV and p. In line with the traditional matching literature, an
additional vacant position for a firm is established at no fixed cost but at a flow
cost c. Thus,
rVV = −c + χ(J e − VV ), (11)
where χ is the job-contact intensity for the firm and J e is the expected value
of the job given wage bargaining. The term J e takes into account the density
of workers actively looking for a job in the market. Thanks to the assumption of
inelastic search effort s, workers actively looking for a job, who are in the interval
[xmin, xν], are met by firms with identical probabilities. Further, the density of
those workers is the conditional density of x in the population.8 It follows that
J e = 1
F(xv)
∫ xν
xmin
J (x′) dF (x′).
8. This is not assumed here, we proved this result in Garibaldi and Wasmer (2001).
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To obtain the third margin, we assume that there is free entry of firms (i.e.,
all vacancy opportunities are exhausted), which leads to VV = 0 and hence to
J e = c/χ . The issue is thus to determine the value of J e, which depends on the
expected wage faced by the firm.
So far we have assumed that e ≥ s and have solved for the partial equilib-
rium properties of the model. To the contrary, we define a fully indivisible labor
supply as one in which entering the labor market involves a sacrifice of home
production regardless of the employment status, i.e., e = s, with e ≤ 1.9 At the
stage of introducing the labor demand equation, we found it convenient to make
this assumption. This insures that J (x) is constant for all newly hired workers
(i.e., for x < xν). This assumption implies that, when VV = 0, the job-creation
margin is
c/χ = (1 − β)e(x
q − xν)
r + λ + δ . (12)
Further, to avoid unimportant constant terms but without implication for the
results, e = 1. Equation (12) makes clear how the labor supply margins affect the
entry decisions of firms. It simply says that the surplus from a job for the firm is
equal to the expected search/recruitment costs, determining χ as a function of xq
and xν .
The model is then simply closed by the assumption of a matching process
between workers and firms. The total number of contacts per unit of time is
denoted by M(u, v), where u is the number of unemployed job seekers in the
population and v is the number of job vacancies. We denote by φ = v/u their
ratio, traditionally called market tightness. We have, under the usual assumption
of constant returns to scale in M , that χ = M/v = χ(φ) with χ ′ < 0. In addition,
the probability of meeting p becomes endogenous also, and can be expressed as
a simple function of market tightness φ. Formally, p is defined as a function
p = M/u = p(φ) with p′ > 0; thus p is uniquely obtained from χ by the
job-creation margin.
3.2. General Equilibrium
Denote by n the nonparticipation rate, that is, the ratio of the number of inactive
workers to the total population (normalized to unity).
9. That e > s is documented, for instance, in Layard, Nickel, and Jackman (1991, pp. 237–241).
On the other hand, we may view e = s as an extreme form of indivisibility of labor. This may
actually capture the fact that the decision to enter the labor market involves a new organization
of an individual’s life, and in an irreversible way (which is precisely what our modeling choice is
about). Given this new organization, unemployed workers must (at least temporarily) be immediately
available for a job, which reduces the extent to which they can produce domestic goods or services.
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Definition 1. A market equilibrium consists of an n-tuple (xν, xq, φ, u, n)
and two wage rules (one for attached, one for unattached workers) satisfying: the
entry margin for workers; the quit margin for workers; the job-creation margin for
firms; the steady-state condition for unemployment flows; and, the steady-state
condition for inactivity flows.
Derivation of the general equilibrium involves three equations solving for
three endogenous variables: xq, xν, φ. Then comes the derivation of the stocks
(unemployment and nonparticipation) from steady-state conditions on flows. The
three equations are:
c
χ(φ)
= (1 − β) x
q − xν
r + λ + δ (JC)
xν
p(φ)
= β x
q − xν
r + λ + δ (Entry)
xq = y + λ
r + λ + δ
∫ xq
xν
F (z) dz. (Quit)
Equation (JC) was obtained from the labor demand equation (12). Equations
(Entry) and (Quit) are simply derived from the definitions of entry and quit in
equations (8) and (10) when e = s = 1 and VV = 0.
Proposition 1. A sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness is y > 0.
The proof is given in Appendix A.5.
3.3. Stocks
In this section we derive the equilibrium stock of workers in different states.
Given the steady-state assumption, one may obtain the unemployment rate, which
is defined as the ratio of the number of unemployed to the active population
(employed plus unemployed):
ur = δ + q
p + δ + q (13)
with q = λ[1 − F(xq)]. The steady-state stocks of the other states are too com-
plicated to report here, but they can be calculated (see proofs in Appendix A.6).
In the general case, equilibrium unemployment is determined by a whole
new set of parameters that are linked to inactivity and nonmarket production
through the quantity q appearing in equation (13). Those parameters are absent
from the classical two-state analysis of the labor market. Second, in steady state,
the effect of the quit rate is exactly the same as an increase in the job-destruction
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rate: it increases the inflows into unemployment, because the number of people
leaving a job for inactivity will be matched by an equivalent number of workers
entering activity through unemployment. Equation (13) has also the implication
that unemployment is affected by q through an indirect effect affecting p: the quit
rate is anticipated by firms along the job creation margin, and a higher q reduces
vacancy posting at a given xν and so leads to a lower job-finding rate p, raising
unemployment.
4. Further Issues
We now explore several additional questions raised by the model: (1) the effi-
ciency of participation margins in a decentralized equilibrium; (2) the distortive
role of taxes on the allocation of time; (3) the role of unemployment benefits in
attracting and keeping workers in the labor force; (4) the role of heterogeneity
of market productivity in wage and employment differences across groups; and
(5) the existence of a search-effort margin that extends our model. Most of these
extensions will be used in the last section of the paper, which is devoted to a
quantitative exercise and a calibration of U.S. flows.
4.1. Welfare and Efficiency
As in Section 3, we assume throughout this section that e = s = 1. Let us first
consider the central planner’s problem. The central planner is maximizing the
sum of market and nonmarket production. The general program is given as
max
NU ,x
ν,xq
(z) = y(1 − n − NU) − cφNU +H
under constraints (A.13) and (A.14) in Appendix A.7, where H is total home
production, n is the number of nonparticipants and NU is the mass of unemployed
workers (total population is normalized to unity). After some intermediate steps
detailed in Appendix A.7, one can show that the optimal values of xq , xν , and
φ (the latter obtained from optimal NU ) are jointly determined by the following
expressions:
c
χ(φ)
= (1 − η)x
q − xν
λ + δ (JC
∗)
xν
p(φ)
= ηx
q − xν
λ + δ (Entry
∗)
xq = y + λ
λ + δ
∫ xq
xν
F (x) dx (Quit∗)
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where −η is the elasticity of χ with respect to φ.10 Comparing these results with
the decentralized equilibrium described by equations (JC), (Entry), and (Quit), we
immediately obtain the Hosios condition η = β. In this case, the decentralized
equilibrium is efficient: it reaches a labor market allocation that is identical to
the social planner’s allocation with optimal taxation. This result might have been
expected, since it is a synthesis of the efficiency results obtained in Pissarides
(2000, chapters 6 and 8) with either endogenous destruction but fixed participa-
tion or exogenous destruction but endogenous participation (though static, with
λ = 0). In what follows, we assume that the Hosios condition is satisfied. To
save on space, all analytical proofs of next sections are in a technical Appendix,
available on request, or in Garibaldi and Wasmer (2003).
4.2. Taxation and Welfare
Things are different when taxes affect wage earnings. Let us introduce a pro-
portional tax on wages at rate t . In this case, all participation margins are dis-
torted. The labor cost can be shown to be wa = β(y + cφ) and wna(x) =
βy + x(1 − β)/(1 − t), and the reduced form of the model now reads:
c(1 − t)
χ(φ)
= (1 − β) x
q − xν
r + λ + δ (JC(t))
xν
p(φ)
= β x
q − xν
r + λ + δ (Entry(t))
xq = y(1 − t) + λ
r + λ + δ
∫ xq
xν
F (x)dx. (Quit(t))
Inspection of these three equations immediately shows that payroll taxes influence
the equilibrium.
Proposition 2. When the quit margin is active (λ > 0), a marginal increase
in payroll taxation reduces the two cutoff points and labor market tightness to an
inefficiently low level: ∂φ/∂t < 0, ∂xq/∂t < 0, and ∂xq/∂t < 0. It also raises
the unemployment rate and reduces the employment rate compared to socially
optimum levels.
The intuition is that taxation of wages reduces the payoff from labor market
activity and thus reduces the incentives to participate (effect on the two participa-
tion margins, xν and xq ). It also raises labor costs compared to market and home
productivity and discourages job creation (effect on φ). The clarification we thus
10. Formally, η = η(φ) = −φχ ′(φ)/χ(φ).
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bring here is that taxes distort the economy along two dimensions—though the
literature tends to consider one (or the other) at a time—and that these distortions
are, moreover, fairly independent of each other.
In fact, in the standard and simplest matching model with exogenous job
destruction (Pissarides 1987), payroll taxes do increase equilibrium unemploy-
ment if one interprets the unemployment income as a non taxable home pro-
duction. Yet, in such models the size of the labor force is fixed, and the only
endogenous variable that may respond to changes in taxation is market tightness.
As Pissarides (1998) has shown, such an effect is present as long as unemployed
income is not taxed. But in our economy both the entry and the quit margins
would also be affected.11
To see the relative independence of the two distortions, consider a special
case of our model when λ = 0, i.e., when home production is constant over time
and the quit margin is latent. In this special case, our previous three equations
simplify to
c
χ(φ)
= y(1 − β) − cβφ
r + δ (14)
xν = c(1 − t)φβ
1 − β (15)
xq = y(1 − t). (16)
In this special economy, employed workers are all attached, since workers with x
above the entry cutoff point xν never participate. The quit margin is thus latent. In
this special case, all wages are independent of home production and labor costs
are equal to w = β(y + cφ). As a result, firms create the appropriate number
of jobs, so that vacancy and unemployment are at the efficient level. Yet, the
overall returns to market participation are distorted and fewer people enter the
labor market. This is a pure labor supply effect. As shown in equation (15), the
entry margin is affected only by taxation through t , since φ is unchanged when
λ = 0. In the general case of λ > 0, a lower φ brings an additional distortion of
xν .
We can finally adduce two further results. First, in the general case of our
model with λ ≥ 0, taxes tends to reduce the employment hoarding effect by
11. Taxation with home production was also studied by Holmlund (2002), but in his paper, the
effect on the quit margin was not considered. Other papers such as Sandmo (1990), Frediksen et al.
(1995), Sorensen (1997), and Kolm (2000) have studied taxation with home production, but these
latter models do not focus on job search and are mainly concerned with tax differentials between
market and home production. There exists also an extensive empirical literature on the effects of
taxes on labor costs. The results of that literature are mixed. See, for example, Tyrväinen (1995) or
Gruber (1997).
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decreasing the distance between xq and xν .12 Since taxes increase the relative
value of home production, a larger tax rate clearly reduces the dynamic incentive
to hold on to a the job. The second result concerns a reverse causality: the larger
is the difference between xq and xν , the larger is the distortive effect of taxation
on market tightness.13 Using the results of Section 2.3 (in particular that the
gap between xν and xq is larger when search frictions increase), this implies
that taxation reduces job creation quantitatively all the more, the more frictions
there are in the economy. Conversely, the adverse marginal effect of taxation on
unemployment disappears as frictions vanish.
4.3. Unemployment Benefits in Partial Equilibrium
We now discuss the effect of the level of and eligibility for unemployment bene-
fits. It is often put forward that they have an insurance role at the cost of reducing
search efforts of the unemployed, with additional adverse effects on wages. Over-
all, unemployment is increased by a lower labor demand. Despite such disincen-
tive effects on the insured workers, the existing literature has also emphasized a
positive link between unemployment benefits and market participation, since an
increase in unemployment insurance reinforces the attractiveness of market par-
ticipation among the noneligible, nonemployed in general and in particular among
people who are out of the labor force. This is called the entitlement effect.14 In
this section, we briefly discuss the implications of an extension of our model to
unemployment benefits when p is fixed, with a focus on the entitlement effect.
Let us assume here that a benefit b is available to workers under two con-
ditions: they have a significant job-search activity and have been previously
employed (i.e., they do not come from nonparticipation; see Fredriksson and
Holmlund (2001) for a similar assumption).15 Unemployed workers coming from
full-time home production then differ from those who were previously employed.
We refer to the latter as covered and to the former as uncovered, with present
discounted value of unemployment denoted by Uc and Uu, respectively. The
xν cutoff point is thus doubled, and we need to define xν and xνc such that
Uc(xνc) = H(xνc) and Uu(xνu) = H(xνu). Let b˜ = λ/(r + λ) ∫ xνc
xνu
F (x) dx.
12. Equation JC(t) shows that xq − xν decreases both because of a lower φ (Proposition 2) and
because of the denominator (a lower 1 − t).
13. Indeed, ∂φ/∂t can be shown to be proportional to −λ ∫ xq
xν
zf (z) dz.
14. This was first pointed out by Mortensen (1977), mentioned by Atkinson and Micklewright
(1991) in an influential survey, and has recently received more attention. Notably, Fredriksson and
Holmlund (2001) studied such effects in their analysis of optimal sequencing of unemployment
benefits. Related papers include Cahuc and Lehmann (2000) and Lehmann and Vanderlinden (2002).
15. We ignore issues of imperfect monitoring from the public service providing the benefits, since
s is assumed to be exogenous.
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Straightforward calculations lead to
c
χ(φ)
= (1 − β) x
q − xνc
r + λ + δ (JC
′)
xq = y + λ
r + λ + δ
∫ xq
xνc
F (x) dx + b˜ (Quit′)
xνu
p
= β x
q − xνc
r + λ + δ +
b˜ + b
r + λ + p (Entry
′)
xνc
p
= β x
q − xνc
r + λ + δ +
b˜ + b
p
. (Entryc′)
Note that b˜ is a crucial additional term. It reflects the gain in surplus for workers
due to the existence of unemployment benefits. We have that b˜ > 0 and b˜ → 0
when b = 0. One can further show that Uu and Uc do not depend on x, and
that the following inequalities hold: Uc > Uu and xνc > xνu. That is, the
covered unemployed are better off than uncovered unemployed, and the decision
of covered unemployed to return to full-time home production is reached for
higher values of home productivity than for the uncovered. Thus, unemployment
benefits attract and retain more active job seekers. Finally, from the perspective
of the firm, there are now two different types of job seekers: the new entrant ones
with x < xν , and the laid-off unemployed workers with x < xνc; see Figure 3.
The novelty of our analysis compared to the literature is the existence of
a participation hoarding effect, which is an additional hoarding effect, different
from the employment hoarding effect described in Section 2.2.2.
Definition 2. The participation hoarding effect is the additional incentive to
participate to the labor market that is induced by conditional eligibility to benefits.
x xq x u
Employed unattached 
Employed attached 
New job seekers 
Laid off job seekers 
x c
Not in the labor force 
 
Figure 3. Employed workers, unemployed workers (covered and uncovered), and nonparticipants
as a function of home productivity.
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This effect is accounted for by the term b˜, that is, the loss of eligibility in case of
a withdrawal from market activity.
Eligible unemployed individuals and employed workers—in order to keep
eligibility—hold on to market participation in anticipation of future changes in
the value of home production. Note that all three cutoff points are affected: b˜
directly raises xνc and xq linearly with slope 1, but by p/(r + λ + p) it also
affects (intertemporally) the cutoff point xνu. The participation hoarding effect
exists only when b > 0 and when b is strictly conditional on a previous employ-
ment spell. A higher b makes b˜ larger; i.e., it becomes more costly to quit, because
doing so entails a loss of eligibility. The increase in xq can be shown to be exactly
equal to b˜. Hence, this effect parallels the employment hoarding effect in (Quit),
which was the additional term λ/(r + λ) ∫ xq
xν
F (x) dx compared to the neoclas-
sical labor supply rule. One can also formally establish the partial equilibrium
comparative statics of the model over the three labor supply cutoff points xq, xνc,
and xν , holding fixed market tightness φ.
Proposition 3. At fixed p(φ), the effect of benefits is such that: ∂xνc/∂b > 0;
∂xν/∂b > 0; and, if δ is sufficiently low, ∂xq/∂b < 0.
The proof is omitted here (see Garibaldi and Wasmer (2003) for details).
This proposition suggests that the effect of an increase in b on xνc and xν is the
same as the standard eligibility effect of benefits, which induces an increase in
the entry cutoff points of both eligible and noneligible unemployed. The effect
of an increase in b on the quit cutoff point is now more complicated. In the quit
margin there are now both the employment hoarding effect and the participation
hoarding effect. While the increase in b reduces the employment hoarding effect,
causing a potential reduction in xq , it also increases the participation hoarding
effect, since with larger benefits workers lose more from a voluntary quit into
inactivity. The overall effect is thus ambiguous and depends on the size of δ. For
low values of δ, the employment hoarding effect prevails and a larger b reduces
the quit margin. For sufficiently large values of δ the second effect dominates,
since larger δ reduces the size of the employment hoarding effect.
To sum up, in the four-state model the presence of the quit margin mitigates the
entitlement effect—but only at low values of δ. The general equilibrium results of
benefits are more complex and are explored in the calibration exercise (Section 5).
4.4. Counterfactual Predictions
The model rationalizes five of the six flows in the labor market and allows for the
previous series of tractable extensions. However, it seems to fail in two dimen-
sions. First, it does not account for the sixth flow between nonparticipation and
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employment; second, it generates a seemingly counterfactual prediction on wages.
In this section we discuss how our model can be consistent with both phenomena.
4.4.1. Wages. In our model, the wage of unattached workers is higher than
the wage of the attached workers. To see this, consider the general equilibrium
value of the wages wa = βy + βcφ and wna(x) = βy + (1 − β)x. Equation
(Entry) implies that if x > xν then (1 − β)x > βcφ. This result is theoretically
sound, since unattached workers have a higher threat point, and it may capture
the intuition that the reservation wage of workers with a stronger preference for
leisure is higher, ceteris paribus. However, this result does not fit with the intuition
that, in a cross-section of workers, higher attachment is positively associated with
wages and participation. To reconcile the two intuitions, one can extend the model
and introduce heterogeneity in market productivity: a higher market productivity
jointly raise wages and labor market attachment. A similar argument could be
made if the heterogeneity across groups includes home productivity parameters
such as λ. These claims are more fully documented in the calibration exercise of
Section 5.
4.4.2. Flows from N to E. Our model accounts for five out of six flows between
employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation (see Figure 4). Let us first
establish some notation. We use lowercase letters (e.g., ean) to denote the flows
rates between those stocks, while uppercase letters (e.g., EN ) denote the total
number of transitions.
We do not properly account for worker flows from N to E, even though (as
detailed in next section) a significant number of workers do actually move directly
from nonemployment to employment. Such workers thus make no transition to
unemployment, which precisely was in our theoretical definition the state in which
workers do actively seek a job.
Employed 
Attached 
x < x 
Employed 
Unattached
x < x < x q
Nonparticipant 
x < x 
Unemployed 
x<x
eaena 
enaea 
un 
uea=p ean=q 
eau=δ enan=q+δ 
nu 
 
 
Figure 4. Labor market flows between three labor market states plus internal flows.
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Several authors, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) in particular, have nonethe-
less argued that the direct flows from inactivity to employment are due to misclas-
sification problems, known technically as a “time aggregation bias.” Any person
now holding a job must have made some minimal effort (going to an interview,
negotiating the wage or working conditions), which cannot be detected by labor
force surveys. The working hypothesis is that EN flows in the data are a pure
misclassification problem, due to undetected inframonthly transitions. The time
aggregation bias is the basic route we follow. There are additional rationalizations.
An interpretation similar to the time aggregation bias is that search effort is
actually continuous, whereas we took it to be inelastically set to either 0 or s.
Thus, some workers with low search effort are misclassified as nonparticipants
when their search effort is strictly positive, yet below the detection point of statis-
ticians.16 These individuals get jobs despite low search effort, and the transition
is recorded as part of the NE flows. The last interpretation, which we have not
yet allowed, is that “jobs bump into people,” even in the absence of search effort,
meaning that truly inactive workers also obtain job offers. An extension of the
model to endogenous search, derived in our technical Appendix, encompasses
these interpretations.
5. A Quantitative Analysis
5.1. The Stylized Facts
Let us first start with a description of the facts we wish to illustrate. Following
Abraham and Shimer (2001) and Faraglia (2003), we use the gross monthly flows
of workers between the three ILO (International Labor Office) market states E,
U , and N . Appendix A.8 provides details of a correction procedure to account
for various biases. Table 1 lists the sample averages for the different flows and
stocks and different age categories. It shows that there are large flows to and
from inactivity, even when we take away the extremes of the age distribution (as
we do when considering the 25–54 sample instead of the 15–64 sample). It is
notably the case that exits from employment to unemployment are less frequent
than exits from employment to inactivity. The other flows have standard values.
Table 1 also indicates that there are important direct flows from inactivity to
employment. To be consistent with the time-aggregation interpretation developed
in Subsection 4.4.2, any NE transition may mask two inframonthly transitions NU
and UE. Our calibration strategy will account for this correction.
16. See Frijters and Van Der Klaauw (2003) for a recent empirical paper on the intensity of search
and changes in transitions from U to N ; included there is a discussion of the impact of personal
characteristics on the arrival rate of offers.
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Table 1. Average monthly flows in the U.S. labor market.
Flowsa
eu en ue un nu ne
15–64 Population
Transitions 1.02 1.62 25.90 16.59 3.46 4.43
Flow rates 0.74 1.18 0.90 0.58 0.81 1.04
Stocks b E/P U/P N/P U/L
72.90 3.50 23.60 4.58
25–54 Population
Transitions 0.83 1.01 25.61 13.28 4.61 3.38
Flow rates 0.68 0.82 0.76 0.40 0.71 0.52
Stocks E/P U/P N/P U/L
81.58 3.00 15.42 3.55
Notes: a The first (second) letter refers to the source (destination) population; e.g., eu is the flow from employment to
unemployment. b E is employment, N is out of the labor force, U is unemployment, and L is the labor force. Values
listed are averages from 1995:10 through 2001:12 with the Abowd and Zellner (1985, Table 5) correction. Source: Author
calculations based on Gross CPS data provided by Robert Shimer and Elisa Faraglia.
5.2. Calibration: Baseline Model
As displayed in Table 1, there are six flows to consider, and the model en-
dogenizes five of them. Consistent with the model and the foregoing discussion
on inframonthly transitions, the calibration will be based on the modified rates:
(nu)TA = nu + ne and (ue)TA = ue + ne, where the superscript TA refers to
the correction for the time aggregation bias. This implies that workers flowing
from N to E are assumed to have made two transitions, from N to U and from
U to E.
The calibration exercise determines the performance of the model in account-
ing for labor market flows once the stocks, determined in steady state from these
flows, are calibrated to replicate the U.S. quantities for the 25–54 population in
the second half of the 1990s. In particular, we want to replicate an unemployment
rate of 3.5% and a nonparticipation rate of 15.4%. The target for market tightness
is set at 0.5, a reference value for most of the matching literature. The calibration
code searches the parameter space for values of y, δ, c, and x0.17
Table 2 reports the assumptions (upper part) and the outcome of calibration
(lower part). We find that 8% of the total working age population is between
xν and xq , among which 5.6% are employed unattached. This means that 2.4%
17. The total number of contacts is x0ψ−ηv (i.e., x0 is a scale parameter and −η is the elasticity
of χ(ψ), the finding rate of workers by firms). The pure monthly discount rate r is 0.005, and
β = η = 0.5 so as to satisfy the Hosios efficiency condition with standard values. The distribution
of home productivity is exponential with parameter  = 0.5. The arrival rate of the idiosyncratic
shock λ is set to 0.06.
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Table 2. Calibration to the U.S. labor market.
Parameters Notation Value U.S. economy
Fixed parameters
Matching elasticity η 0.5
Average home productiona −1 2.00
Unemployed income b 0.00
Discount rate r 0.005
Idiosyncratic shock rate λ 0.06
Workers’ surplus share β 0.5
Code determined parameters
Separation rate δ 0.01
Productivity y 3.93
Matching function constant xo 0.71
Search costs c 6.30
Equilibrium values
Entry margin xν 3.15
F(xν) 0.79
Quit margin xq 4.08
F(xq) 0.87
Market tightness φ 0.50
Calibrated statistics
Unemployment rate u 3.55 3.55
Nonparticipation rate n 15.40 15.42
Implied statistics
Share household GDP 0.30 0.33
eu Flow rate eu 0.83 0.68
en Flow rate en 0.67 0.82
(ue)TA Flow rate (ue)TA 1.50 1.47
un Flow rate un 0.04 0.40
(nu)TA Flow rate (nu)TA 0.18 1.23
Extended unemployment 5.41 4.97
Attached employed Ea 76.31
Nonattached employed Ena 5.29
Employment hoardingb 0.14
Attached wage wa 3.54
Nonattached wage wna 3.77
Diagnostic statistics
Absolute fit Rabs 0.62 1
Relative fit Rdev 0.56 1
Notes: a Distribution is exponential with parameter  = 0.50. b as a fraction of market productivity. Source: Author
calculations.
of the population corresponds to the marginally attached defined by Jones and
Ridell (1999) with reference to the Canadian labor market.18 As Table 2 shows,
18. For the United States, Sorrentino (1993, 1995) has established several definitions of unem-
ployment ranging from 1 (the most conservative) to 7 (the broadest one) on the basis of answers
of respondents to survey questions about their willingness to have a job, the desired number of
hours, and the duration of their current unemployed spell. The ILO definition corresponds to Defini-
tion 4; Definition 6 includes workers who report wanting a job but not searching for one. Using the
estimates of Sorrentino (1993), extended unemployment in the United States (including marginally
attached workers) is 40% larger than given by the conventional definition. This implies that extended
unemployment in the United States is about 5% of the working-age population.
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extended unemployment in our calibration is 5.41%, less than half a percent-
age point larger than the corresponding U.S. estimates. Household production is
approximately 30% of market production (GNP), a statistic that appears to be in
line with existing estimates on the size of the informal sector (Eisner 1988 finds
33%). Table 2 presents also a quantitative measure of the employment hoarding
effect, and it shows that the incentive to hold on to job a accounts for 14% of
market productivity.
In order to assess the goodness of fit of our calibration exercise, we rely on
two quantitative indicators, that measure the distance between our calibration and
the U.S. economy. The first indicator is Rabs; it is expressed as
Rabs = 1 −
5∑
i=1
∣∣∣ flowUSi − flowModeli
∣∣∣
5∑
i=1
flowUSi
where flowUSi and flowModeli refer to one of the five labor flows calculated for
the U.S. economy and for the artificial economy. The indicator Rabs indicates
the average fit of our with respect to the U.S. statistics, where the fit is measured
in absolute value. A perfect match would yield a value of Rabs equal to 1 while
a value of 0 would indicate an average deviation of an order of magnitude. The
indicator Rrel is constructed in a similar way but with the distance calculated in
percentage terms.
Table 2 shows that the model economy calibrated to U.S. stocks can match
between 56% and 62% of the flows, depending on which of the two indica-
tors is being used. Nevertheless, as is clear from Table 2, the actual degree of
resemblance of the various statistics varies across flows. In particular, our model
economy matches very well three of the five target flows (eu, ueTA, and en) but
fall short of accounting for the flows un and nu. Further, our economy implies
that non attached workers enjoy a higher wage than attached workers. In the next
section, we assess whether a more accurate accounting of the structure of the
unemployment benefits as well as relaxing the representative agent assumption
can improve various dimensions of the calibration.
5.3. Calibration: Extensions
In this section we present two extensions of our baseline calibration. The first
extension deals with market productivity differences in the population and the
second with unemployment benefits. The results are displayed in Table 3.
In the first simulation we assume that there are two types of agents in the
population: individuals with high market productivity and individuals with low
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Table 3. Calibration to the U.S. labor market: Extensions.
Heterogeneitya
Parameters Notation l a h Four states U.S.
Productivity y 3.53 3.93 4.33 4.13
Matching elasticity η 0.5 0.4
Discount rate r 0.01 0.01
Idiosyncratic shock rate λ 0.058 0.06
Workers’ surplus share β 0.5 0.4
Average home production −1 2.0 2.0
Time in market activity e 0.90 0.85
Matching function constant xo 0.71 0.74
Separation rate δ 0.01 0.01
Search costs c 6.30 6.03
Eligible unemployed income b 0.00 1.149
Calibrated statistics
Unemployment rate u 4.10 3.61 3.12 3.55 3.55
Nonparticipation rate n 19.02 15.76 12.50 15.40 15.42
Market tightness φ 0.44 0.50 0.56 0.50
Implied statistics
eu Flow rate eu 0.78 0.83 0.87 0.78 0.68
en Flow rate en 0.78 0.68 0.57 0.69 0.82
(ue)TA Flow rate ueTA 1.56 1.6 1.44 1.47 1.47
un Flow rate un 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.40
(nu)TA Flow rate nuTA 0.27 0.20 0.13 0.19 1.23
Share of covered unemployed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.33
Replacement rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.2
Attached employed Ea 71.92 75.95 79.98 77.24
Nonattached employment Ena 5.74 5.27 4.79 4.36
Employment hoardingb 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.11
Participation hoardingb 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Average wage w 3.17 3.55 3.93 3.56
Diagnostic statistics
Absolute fit Rabs 0.63 0.65 1
Relative fit Rdev 0.57 0.59 1
Notes: a l, a, and h refer, respectively, to the low, average, and high segment of the economy. bAs a fraction of market
productivity. Source: Author calculations.
market productivity. The former have productivity equal to yh while the latter have
productivity equal to yl , with yh > yl . For simplicity, we assume that both popu-
lations have identical size. We also assume that the aggregate economy comprises
the high-productivity and low-productivity segments. We start from the param-
eters of the three-state model and then set yl and yh so that the average values
of endogenous stock variables match the U.S. economy. We thereby uncover the
underlying properties that are the result of an aggregate composition effect.
Table 3 highlights several important implications. First, high-productivity
individuals are high-wage individuals. Second, low-wage individuals have larger
flows to and from inactivity. Observe that the en flow for the high productivity
group is just 0.1% while it is ten times larger for low-productivity workers. The
same is true of other flows to and from inactivity. This suggests that low-wage
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individuals (and hence low productivity) account for most transitions to and from
inactivity. Third, the table shows that a larger share of unattached workers is made
up of low productivity workers.
The second extension presented in Table 3 provides a better description of
the unemployment benefit system, one that is in line with the model presented
here. The calibration is based on the aggregate statistics used in Table 2. The
parameters are similar to those used in the baseline calibration, with the only
notable exception being the Hosios condition, which is now satisfied for a value
of β = η = 0.4. The results are as follows. First, our aggregate indicators of
fits increase to 59% and 65% percent respectively, suggesting that improving the
specification of the unemployment benefit system helps explain a larger share of
the flows. Second, the calibration of the unemployment benefits is fairly accurate,
since it implies a replacement rate of 30% and a coverage of 50%, statistics that are
in line with the U.S. market. Finally, Table 3 presents also a quantitative measure
of the participation hoarding effect and indicates that it amounts to (almost) 10%
of the level of unemployment benefits.
6. Conclusions
Our model allows for a rather precise description of the labor market. It
includes several categories of individuals: attached employed workers, unattached
employed workers, unemployed workers, marginally attached nonemployed
workers and true nonparticipants. All this is delivered within a tractable model of
endogenous job creation and the solution is characterized using only three equa-
tions, solving for two reservation values for workers and the job creation rate. Five
of the six usual labor market flows are accounted for in the benchmark model;
the sixth requires specific assumptions about flows from inactivity to employ-
ment. Policy implications are explored: the roles of taxation and unemployment
benefits are different and more complex than with inelastic labor supply or static
participation, and this is due to the emergence of the quit margin.
An additional possible extension concerns the dynamic implications of the
model. Is it possible that accounting for participation improves the quality of
macroeconomic models of the business cycle? The answer is a priori ambigu-
ous,19 and extending our model to investigate its dynamic properties is therefore
19. Veracierto (2002) argues that including leisure-work choices into RBC models generates coun-
terfactual implications—notably, with too low volatility of employment fluctuations. Shimer (2003a,
2003b) and Hall (2003) have also argued that the standard search model was predicting too high
volatility of wages and too low volatility of employment and vacancies. In our setup, a positive pro-
ductivity shock would reduce workers’ incentives to quit and thus additionally raise employment.
Further, as we noticed in Section 3.3, a lower quit rate further raises vacancy creation as firms antic-
ipate longer periods of profits. The bottom line is that our model may generate a higher employment
response to productivity shocks. All these interesting points were made clear to us by a referee.
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important. Faraglia (2003) has made some progress in this direction, but with
indications that there are difficulties associated with accounting for the dynamics
of distribution of workers across states.
Beyond dynamic issues, extensions of this work include policy simulations of
the impact of “workfare” policies and subsidies toward activity, a better account-
ing of firms’ heterogeneity, and the introduction of several classes of workers.
This paper is a first step in the direction of an accurate calibration of frictional
labor markets.
Appendix
A.1. Wage Determination
The proof involves computing the average surplus of workers, firms, and the
match. We define
Sw =
∫ xmax
xmin
max(W ′, U ′, H ′) − max(U ′, H ′)dF (x′)
and
Sf =
∫ xmax
xmin
max(J ′ − JV , 0)dF (x′).
Let S = Sf + Sw. Thanks to (5), we have Sf = (1 − β)S and Sw = βS.
Note first that, given vH > vU, we have that, for all x such that H(x) > U(x),
necessarily max(W − U, 0) = W − U . This is easily seen from the Bellman
equations (2) and (3). Taking differences of the Bellman equations (1) – (3), we
obtain: if H ≤ U ,
(r + λ + δ + p)(W − U)(x) = w(x) + (s − e)x + λβS (A.1)
if H ≤ U ,
(r + λ + δ)(W − H)(x) = w(x) − ex + λβS (A.2)
and
(r + λ + δ)(J − JV )(x) = y − w(x) + λ(1 − β)S − rJ V . (A.3)
Using (5) and simplifying for discount factors (r + δ + λ), terms in S cancel
out and the expression for wages comes easily: we obtain
wa(x) = β(y − rVV ) + (1 − β)[(e − s)x + p(W − U)(x)] (A.4)
wna(x) = β(y − rVV ) + (1 − β)ex (A.5)
where a refers to attached workers (U ≥ H ) and na refers to unattached workers
(H ≥ U ).
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A.2. Slopes of Value Functions and Reservation Strategies
Recall from Section A.1 that for all x such that H > U , we also have W > U .
It is thus sufficient to prove that asset values are increasing, linear (or piecewise
linear), continuous, and that U(x) is less steep than H(x). Hence for all x < xν ,
where xν is defined as U(xν) = H(xν), we necessarily have W > U > H . Now,
if xmin > xν > xmax (which we will assume), then xq > xν .
Let’s prove this. Using the wages derived in (A.1), we can rewrite the four
Bellman equations of employed (attached and unattached), unemployed, and not
in the labor force. Taking the derivative with respect to x, and denoting by aaW ,
anaW , aU , and aH the slopes, we obtain a four-by-four system linking the four
slopes. Taking two-by-two differences, we find that aaW − aU is proportional to−(e − s) and thus negative, anaW − aH is proportional to −e and thus negative
and aU − aH is the sum of −s/(r + λ) and a term proportional to aaW − aU , and
thus is negative as well. Overall, aH ≥ aU ≥ aaW and aH ≥ anaW ≥ aaW . Given
W(x) > U(x) > H(x) for x < xν and aH ≥ aU , the intersection of W(x) with
H(x) denoted by xq is thus necessarily to the right of the intersection of U(x)
and H(x). Thus xq ≥ xν . This is represented in Figure 1. One can also prove that
anaW ≥ aaW .
A.3. Determining the Surplus S(x) and S
Let us first define S(x) = J (x)+VV +W(x)− max(U(x),H(x)). Observe that
∂S
∂x
= −e
r + λ+ δ for x
q ≥ x ≥ xν whereas ∂S/∂x = (−e + s)/(r + λ + δ + βp)
for xν ≥ x ≥ xmin. Given that S(xq) = 0 and that S(x) is continuous in xν with
a discontinuity in slopes, we have
S(x) = e(x
q − x)
r + λ + δ for x
q ≥ x ≥ xν.
We can also determine the value of S defined in A.1. After an integration by parts,
we obtain
S = e − s
r + λ + δ + βp
∫ xν
xmin
F(x)dx + e
r + λ + δ
∫ xq
xν
F (x)dx. (A.6)
A.4. Existence and Uniqueness in Partial Equilibrium
The proof for uniqueness of xν, xq for a given p is simple to obtain. First, the
expression of the quit margin in equation (10) is downward sloping, while the
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expression for the entry margin in equation (8) is upward sloping. It is also easy
to see that the intersections with the horizontal axis (xν = xmin) are such that the
intercept of the entry margin is below xmin while the intercept of the quit margin
is given implicitly by
xq = y
e
− r
e
V V + λ
r + λ + δ
∫ xq
xmin
F(x)dx.
A sufficient condition for uniqueness is that the latter is above xmin, which is the
case when y is sufficiently large.
A.5. Existence and Uniqueness of the General Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 1. The existence (and uniqueness) of the equilibrium de-
scribed by (Entry), (Quit), and (JC) can be shown by eliminating xν from those
equations, and than noting that (Entry) and (JC) jointly imply
xν = β
1 − β cφ. (A.7)
This states, in a reduced form, that higher shares of the surplus and better labor
market prospects induce further entry of workers into the labor market. Using
(A.7), yields two relations between φ and xq that have opposite slopes. One
can thus express the equilibrium in the space [φ, xq ]. The modified JC curve
is positively sloped and states that more stable workers (higher xq ) raise job
creation. The modified (Quit) equation is downward sloping and states that, in a
tighter labor market, the surplus of a job is lower and the capital loss of quitting
is lower, reducing xq . Comparing the intercepts of the two modified (JC) and
(Quit) equations, we can show existence and uniqueness. The intercept of the
(JC) curve is xq = 0, and the intercept of the quit margin curve is defined by
q0 = y + λ/(r + λ + δ)
∫ q0
0 dF(x) ≥ y > 0 as long as y > 0.
A.6. Stocks and Flows
We use upper letters for the stocks of workers, where Ea , Ena , NU, and N = n
denote (respectively) the employed attached, employed unattached, unemployed,
and nonparticipants (in full-time home production). One can write the evolution
“zwu003050274” — 2005/5/27 — page 879 — #29
Garibaldi and Wasmer Unemployment and Labor Market Flows 879
of the stocks of workers in the four categories by:
dEa
dt
= −(ean + eau + eaena)Ea + ueaNU + eaenaEna (A.8)
dEna
dt
= −(enan + enau + enaea)Ena + eaenaEna (A.9)
dNU
dt
= −(uea + un)NU + eauEa + nuN (A.10)
dN
dt
= −nuN + enanEna + unNU + eanEa. (A.11)
Intermediate calculations available in our technical appendix lead to equation
(13) and
NλF(θν) = (λ − λF(xν) + p)NU − δ
(
δ + q + λF(xν)
δ + λ E
)
.
A.7. Welfare Analysis
The proof of the social planner problem is as follows. The social planner maxi-
mizes, over NU, xν , and xq
 = y(1 − n − NU) − cφNU +H (A.12)
whereH is home production of inactive workers, n are the non participants, and
NU is the mass of unemployed workers (total population is normalized to unity)
implying that φNU = v the vacancy rate. Observe that ur = NU/(E + NU).
Denoting by f H (x) the density of inactive workers, home production is
H = n
∫ +∞
xν
xf H (x)dθ.
We can prove thatf H is proportional tof ; then, max
u,xν,xq
 subject to the constraints
pNu − (δ + q)(1 − NU − n) = 0 (A.13)
(1 − NU − n)
[
δ
δ + λ(δ + q) −
λ
λ + δ λF (x
ν)
]
− NU(λ + p) + λF(xν) = 0
(A.14)
immediately leads to (Entry*), (Quit*), and (JC*).
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A.8. Flow Data
All flows tabulated from labor force surveys suffer from serious misclassification
problems. There are two major problems with the unadjusted gross flows data
derived from the CPS (Current Population Survey). First, imperfect matching
of labor force data leaves approximately 15% of the eligible observations with
labor force status missing in one month or the other. Second, the measurement of
changes in labor-force status may be biased because of random respondent, inter-
viewer, or coding errors even when these classification errors do not generate bias
in measurement of the levels. Abowd and Zellner (1985) have proposed a proce-
dure that resolves these issues. We apply their adjustment under the assumption
that these biases are time invariant, as in Abraham and Shimer (2001). We only
consider the post June 1995 period (since there are missing data between June
and September 1995) for two groups of workers: the 15–64 population (here-
after referred to as “total”) and the 25–54 population (“prime-age”). When the
flows are deflated by the origin population, they are called transition rates; when
deflated by the total (or prime-age) population, they are called “flow rates”.
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